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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, : Case No. 880154 
Priority No, 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Issues, 
Statement of the Case, and Statement of Facts are set forth in 
Appellant's opening brief of iv-v, 1-6. Appellant takes this 
opportunity to reply to Respondent's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (Clarification) 
In its brief at 5, the State notes that the defendant 
objected to the introduction of the loose-leaf binder of photographs 
and the photo array. See R. 51. The State also acknowledges that 
the State agreed not to use the loose-leaf binder and to alter the 
photo array as stipulated. Respondent's Brief at 5. 
Despite the court's ruling and the State's stipulation 
not to use the binder (and presumably the photos therein), the State 
later attempted to admit as Exhibit 9 the mug shot photograph of the 
defendant which was contained in Exhibit 7. T. 67. Defense counsel 
objected again during trial to the admission of that photograph. 
T. 67-71. Despite its earlier ruling, the trial court admitted the 
mug shot as State's Exhibit 9. R. 71. 
In addition, the Statement of the Facts contained in the 
State's brief at 7 may leave the impression that the idea that SR-65 
may have been closed on the day of the incident originated with a 
police officer who was in the courtroom and not the prosecutor. On 
the contrary, when the court directly asked the prosecutor how the 
project manager of SR-65 came to his attention, he responded that he 
"asked Officer Hutchings to find something to determine whether or 
not that was open and to find—and to find someone able to testify 
to that." T. 123. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in admitting the mug shot into 
evidence since if it had any minimal probative value, that value was 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact. Furthermore, 
taping the front and profile photographs did not mask the fact that 
it was a mug shot. 
Allowing the State to call a surprise rebuttal witness 
violated the statute and due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND 
PUBLISHING A MUG SHOT OF DEFENDANT. 
A. EVEN IF THE MUG SHOT HAD MINIMAL PROBATIVE 
VALUE, SUCH MINIMAL PROBATIVE VALUE WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
The State claims that the mug shot had such significant 
probative value that the prejudicial effect of its admission did not 
substantially outweigh such probative value. Respondent's Brief at 
11. In particular, the State argues that the mug shot was not 
offered to show criminal disposition or to prejudice the jury, but 
rather to bolster its witness' identification of the defendant and 
otherwise "rebut defendant's strategic implications that Leavitt's 
initial identification was uncertain and her subsequent selection of 
defendant as her attacker . . . resulted from repeated 
confrontations with defendant's photo or person rather than from her 
memory of her attacker." Respondent's Brief at 10-11. 
It is Appellant's position that the mug shot was not 
admissible under Rule 404(b) to establish identity. However, if 
this Court disagrees and finds some relevance to the mug shot, it is 
Appellant's further position that such minimal probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the overwhelming prejudicial effect of 
the photograph. 
The State relies on a statement made by defense counsel 
outside the presence of the jury to bolster its argument that the 
mug shot was a critical piece of evidence in establishing identity. 
Respondent's Brief at 11. Such statement is taken out of context 
and ignores defense counsel's comments leading up to that statement 
as set forth below: 
- 3 -
She testified there was no—that she had every 
ability to know that that first picture and second 
picture were of the same person. So there is no 
question. It's not as though she were picking 
some other one's picture or the second picture was 
in some way misleading, or the first picture. 
There is no question in the evidence, and that's 
not our question. I don't think the jury would 
suspect that. 
T. 68. For entire transcript of argument and the court's ruling on 
admission of the mug shot during trial, see Addendum A. 
Furthermore, the State's reliance on defense counsel's 
argument is misguided and unwarranted since the relevant inquiry in 
determining whether the mug shot was admissible is the nature of the 
evidence before the jury and not counsel's argument. The State 
contends that the identity issue "could only be settled by the jury 
with the aid of the photo so heavily questioned by defendant." 
Respondent's Brief at 12. A review of the testimony establishes 
that the prosecutor, not the defendant, did most of the questioning 
regarding the first photograph and that defense counsel asked only a 
few questions regarding the photograph. All of the testimony was 
taken prior to the argument and ruling set forth in Addendum A. 
On direct examination of Ms. Leavitt, during his case in 
chief, the prosecutor elicited the response that nI came across a 
picture that looked like the man that beat me." T. 39. The 
prosecutor explored that response by several additional questions. 
See Addendum B for transcript of prosecutor's direct examination of 
Ms. Leavitt regarding the mug shot. 
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On cross-examination, defense counsel asked three 
questions regarding the selection of the first photograph and 
several questions regarding the subsequent identifications. See 
Addendum C for entire transcript of cross-examination regarding mug 
shot and subsequent identifications. 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked several 
questions regarding Ms. Leavitt's selection of the first photograph 
and the difference in the defendant's appearance in the two 
photographs. T. 56. See Addendum D for entire transcript of 
prosecutor's redirect examination on this issue. Ms. Leavitt 
testified that the defendant's hair was a little different in the 
first photograph and that the first photograph appeared smaller and 
older. She testified further that she had selected the photograph 
"[b]ecause of his face. It's the man that attacked me." T. 56-7. 
On recross-examination, the following exchange occurred: 
Q [by defense counsel]. Ms. Leavitt, the obvious 
differences between the two photographs that you 
indicated you were able to observe did not affect 
your ability to know that was a photograph of the 
same man whose photograph you had already picked? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It did not affect or it did affect it? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. You knew that the second photograph was a 
photograph of the same person that you had picked 
from the first photograph? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You could tell that similarity? 
A. Yes. 
- 5 -
T. 57-58. Hence, defense counsel did not "heavily question" the 
choice of the first photograph, and the probing regarding the 
initial selection and further identification was initiated, 
continued and clarified by the prosecutor. Furthermore, a complete 
review of the transcript establishes that there were not significant 
differences in the first and second photographs, that Ms. Leavitt 
knew both photographs were of the same individual, and that her 
hesitancy in selecting the first photograph was not based on its age 
or differences in the defendant's appearance. 
Furthermore, defense counsel's argument that after 
repeated viewings of the defendant in pictures and in person, Ms. 
Leavitt's identification of Mr. Albretsen as the perpetrator became 
solidified is based on the similarity between the photographs and 
defendant's current appearance, not the differences. Had defendant 
changed significantly and defense counsel were arguing that the 
first photograph did not resemble appellant, or had Ms. Leavitt 
selected another person at some point in the identification 
procedure, the State's argument might be more compelling. However, 
where defense counsel's argument was that she saw the identical face 
several times and thereby became convinced that he was the 
perpetrator, the State has no need for the first photograph. 
Because the jury was not presented with a question as to 
whether Ms. Leavitt had in fact identified Mr. Albretsen at each 
stage of the identification process, and because there is no 
evidence supporting the State's assertion "that Ms. Leavitt's 
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12. The State ignores however, the dictum in State v. McCardell, 6 5 
2 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) as set forth in Appellant's opening 
brief at 11, that "McCardell1s arguments on this point clearly have 
merit" Id, at 946. 
The State cites cases from several jurisdictions which 
"have resolved the question of whether photographs, specifically 
"mug shots" may be admitted for identification purposes." 
Respondent's Brief at 13. While some of the cases cited by the 
State are distinguishable,^ Appellant recognizes and readily 
concedes that some jurisdictions permit the admission of mug shots 
under certain circumstances. Appellant maintains, however, that the 
position of such jurisdictions is inconsistent with this State's 
consistent acknowledgement of the prejudicial effect of prior crimes 
1 For example, United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 378, 
384 (4the Cir 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 860 (1974) is 
distinguishable from the instant case since the "photograph had 
legitimate probative relevance to demonstrate the difference in 
Lee's appearance at the time of the trial as compared to the time of 
a prior photographic identification." . . . Other than a slight 
difference in hair style, there is no evidence in this case that 
defendant's appearance was different at the time the mug shot was 
taken. In the instant case, defense counsel's argument that 
repeated viewings solidified the identification is based on 
similarities between defendant's appearance at the time of trial and 
the photograph. In Futrell v. Wyrick, 716 F.2d 1207, 1208 (8th Cir 
1983), although the Court upheld the admission of the mug shots, it 
pointed out that "[t]his court has recognized the potentially 
prejudicial effect of exposing -a jury to mug shots [citations 
omitted]. In Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E. Rptr.2d 1038 (Mass 
1983) significant discrepancies as to the witnesses description and 
the defendant's appearance existed. Also, the defendant attempted 
to establish that lighting was poor. The profile picture of the 
defendant was necessary in Weichell to show defendant's crooked 
nose, among other things. In the instant case, no discrepancies as 
to description or necessity for a profile shot existed. 
- 8 -
e v I d e n c e , and req u e s t s t:I: 1 at tII: :ii s Coi ir t: £o 1 1 ow the i:a11ona 1 e in the 
o v e r w e i g h s *;- *>t- :Mtive vt. . ^ee Ap p e l l a t e ! s r^ief at 
^ •«-ata''? attempt h i- Ci*- m'ii e" C o m m o n w e a l : 
Trower; • , 2 3 , .., . -. •-:.r.' : -^~-* v Is 
not c o m p e l l i n g , . The S t a t e a r m i e s t h a - * v - uot:<*orapn . n Trowery 
was of f e r e :I ' * • 
no i n d i c a t i o n • :iai triers *•* J a A I . . . - f e n o t or a;; <i t •,»-up . oy :;he 
d P f P n d a n t" f > d i q r r p d ' t" *- h p \ i t r i p e s ' ^ •! : ^ n t - ' £ r a l " 1 - *: " n r- < * u r *" -* d 
* •- ^ut '-* . t n - . n.r i • •. c a s e n t r o a u c e d t n - s . : i ' i r m g : : s 
c a s e - i n - c h i e L . i o- • audi t : i '~ • ~- ' }^rlr^ " -' r >unu n 
unnecessary i-^ ^ g r ^ *,.*., .^snef?, . ..,- <o,.v- * - v ~ *^~ ^h^ 
t r i a l ' ' o u ' ' : o l i v e * c a u t i ^ n a ' y e y ^ i ^ u e n n i e n t i f ica1-. : on 
or : h e rruu . r.ne Trowery c o u r t o o i r r - o o,4-
,.w a case .v'here the evidenc*.- is introduced 
merely for the purpose of identification, mo.-;: 
of the probative value of the evidence is lv -
while the prejudicial effect remains 
undiminished. 
: ••:.. a c i / : 
..ic oLac-j'o utternp i. .L . iJu... . State v. K u t z e n , 
P.2d 253(Ha dt Apo 1)30} in a 1 \o flawed. See R e s p o n d e d ' ' 3rief a 
17 .
 t :• i 
we(H :.'. . :: -'oduc^o •-• o ~ Lnf er-?nces of uro*^ , : ao L 1 . : y ^n n 
G u n d e r s o n 1 ^ i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of A p p e l l a n t s " lo^J ?.2d at 2 6 J ; / ^ n e 
- in 
State's assumption that such language requires admission of mug 
shots where inferences of unreliable identification are raised is 
incorrect when the Kutzen case is read as a whole. 
The Kutzen court acknowledged that mug shots have the 
prejudicial effect of suggesting prior criminal activity to the 
jury, and embraced the three part test outlined in United States v. 
Posher, 568 F.2d 207 214 (1st Cir 1978) for determining whether, 
despite such prejudicial effect, mug shots are admissible. That 
three part test is as follows: 
1. The Government must have a demonstrable 
need to introduce the photographs; and 
2. The photographs themselves, if shown to the 
jury, must not imply that the defendant has a 
prior criminal record; and 
3. The manner of introduction at trial must be 
such that it does not draw particular attention 
to the source of implications of the 
photographs. 568 F.2d at 214. 
Kutzen, 620 P.2d at 262-3. 
Based on the issues raised in Kutzen, it appears that at 
least a portion of the defense was based on faulty identification. 
Furthermore, immediately following the dictum quoted by the State, 
the Kutzen court pointed out that because the witness made an 
unequivocal in-court identification, the mug shot evidence was 
unnecessary. That is precisely the situation in the instant case. 
In addition, even if an attack on the reliability of the 
identification is being made, the State must still establish a need 
for the mug shots. Such attack does not make the prejudicial 
photographs automatically admissible. As outlined supra, the State 
- 10 -
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Brief of Respondent at 18-19. Contrary to the States argument, 
State's exhibit 8 as admitted consists of six separate frontal 
photographs, not double-shot frontal and profile mug shots. 
In addition, despite the State's assertion to the 
contrary, the court did not admit Mr. Albretsen's mug shot "noting 
that the photo display of six pictures which were of the same nature 
had already been admitted." Brief of Respondent at 18. That 
statement of finding attributed to the court by the State in its 
brief is actually a statement made by the prosecutor (T. 72). 
The dictum in McCardell relied upon by the State in it's 
brief at 19 is not compelling since the procedures utilized in this 
case did not "ensure" that the jury would be unaware that the 
pictures were mug shots, and may well have heightened that 
awareness. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 14-17. 
As appellant previously acknowledged supra at 8, some 
jurisdictions admit mug shot evidence. Of those jurisdictions, some 
recognize the inherently prejudicial nature of mug shots and require 
masking or cropping procedures in order to limit the inherent 
prejudice of such evidence. See People v. Travier, 197 N.W.2d 890 
(Mich App 1972). However, the masking must ensure that the jurors 
are not aware the photograph was a mug shot. In this case where 
both front and profile views were included and items were visible 
through the tape when the picture was held up, the masking procedure 
did not ensure that the photographs did not imply to the jury that 
Appellant had a prior criminal record. 
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The State relies on Williams v. State, 437 A 2d 665 (Md 
App 1982) and People v, Gilliam, 239 N.W.2d 396 (Mich App 1976) for 
the proposition that Mr. Miller's testimony was offered solely to 
discredit the alibi testimony and not refute it, and therefore the 
testimony is not subject to the notice provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§77-14-2 (1982). The State offers no Utah authority in support of 
this proposition, and ignores the plain language of the statute 
which requires the state to 
file and serve the defendant with the 
addresses, as particularly as are known to him, 
of the witnesses the State proposes to offer to 
contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi 
evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-2 (1953 as amended) (emphasis added). The 
plain language of the Utah Statute requires notice regardless of 
whether the testimony "refutes" or merely "discredits" the testimony 
of the alibi witness. 
In State v. Haddenham, 585 P.2d 447 (Utah 1978) this 
Court stated in dictum that "the prosecuting attorney is required to 
serve notice of witnesses it proposes to offer in rebuttal to 
discredit the defendant's alibi." Id. at 448 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, because Mr. Miller's testimony raised a question as to 
whether the drive into Parley's Canyon occurred on a day other than 
the day in question, the impact of the testimony was to "refute" Ms. 
Davis' testimony. The distinction drawn by the State is meaningless 
and would emasculate the notice requirement since almost any 
testimony other than a direct statement by the rebuttal witness that 
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•V .
 f (-; 
f o r a r o e a 
, .Id 
d e f e n d a n t 
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1
 Morr 1 * • f. • , ~ „ >DO r r 
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recognized fcnat either a mistrial or continuance is the appropriate 
remedy whp" 
appropriate procedure to be followed under the circumstances of this 
case. The State's suggestion that failure to request a continuance 
works against the defendant is an unduly technical approach, and 
serves as an attempt to hide behind technical procedural arguments 
in an effort to avoid the glaring error which occurred when the 
State called Mr. Miller as a surprise rebuttal witness. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Douglas R. Albretsen, respectfully requests 
that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial absent the erroneously admitted mug shot evidence and with 
proper notice as to the witnesses the State intends to call to rebut 
his alibi defense. 
Respectfully submitted this X~[ day of April, 1989. 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for DefendarfJi/Appellant 
'<^?/fP-C <*)<££( 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
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THE COURT: All right. 
MR. STOTT: I think there needs to be a record 
made either in chambers or outside the presence of the jury. 
THE COURT: Okay. We can just have the jury 
step out a moment then. I just want to admonish you not 
to talk about anything. 
[Whereupon, the jury left the courtroom.] 
MR. STOTT: Your Honor, this is the matter we 
talked with you about at the side bar. This is the picture 
that was shown — not shown but was in the book that 
Maureen Leavitt took out. We have now taped over it any 
references to Salt Lake County or any numbers. I propose 
to show this, and identify the picture she first saw so 
the jury can see the differences between this picture and 
the other picture, which has already been cross-examined 
and direct examination concerning, and which will be very 
important in arguments. 
MS. LOY: I would object. Two grounds for my 
objection: First, the picture, despite having some effort 
to cover up, you can't read what is there but there is clearljy 
something blocked out. But more importantly, this is a 
mug shot. Any layperson that has ever seen a television 
show about police knows it's a mug shot. It comes from 
the police taking a picture of someone at the time of arrest 
whether or not they are convicted of something. It looks 
prejudicial. 
Secondly, it's a picture of my client which, 
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1 from all common sense, layperson who used makes him appear 
2 to be intoxicated, or under the influence of drugs, or perhap^ 
3 asleep. There has been no testimony the person in any part 
. of this case looked under the influence of anything. 
Thirdly, I think that that picture is not — 
that the Court's initial order was correct, there is some 
reason it becomes necessary. The witness was asked where 
did you identify the second picture, and she indicated the 
reason was what she saw in the second picture, and she was 
9 asked what the differences in the picture was. And she 
10 described that. She testified there was no — that she 
H had every ability to know that that first picture and second 
picture were of the same person. So there is no question. 
It's not as though she were picking some other one's picture 
or the second picture was in some way misleading, or the 
first picture. There is no question in the evidence, and 
that's not our question. I don't think the jury would suspecjt 
that. 
17 Our question in the case is that when in fact 
18 she picked that picture, she was not certain, but as she 
19 J saw more and more pictures or personal appearances by 
Mr. Albretsen, it became cemented in her mind. It's common 
sense that would be our position from the questions we have 
asked. To bring this picture in is unnecessary and prejudicial, 
MR. STOTT: That's why we need the picture, 
because this explains where she said that looks like the 
man, we're not introducing it whether he's in an alcohol 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1 stupor or what, but the point is he does not look —this 
2 is not a picture that looks exactly like him or the other 
3 picture, because he does look different. And that's the 
* whole point, why she wasn't able to say for sure this picture! 
does look different. It's different than Mr. Albretsen. 
That's why she was able to say, "This is the man."' Unless 
the jury sees that, they are not going to understand that, 
and she's going to get away with that argument, and that's 
why we want it in. 
9 MS. LOY: It's not we want to get away with 
10 anything. I resent the comment by Mr. Stott just like when 
\\ J the jury comes back by saying, "She does not want you to 
say that." The Court should rule on the objection and, 
allowed or refused, without Mr. Stott making personal derogatJDi 
remarks. 
As to the photo, the witness never testified 
she had trouble with the first photograph. She testified, 
her words were, "I think this is the man," and she told 
us why she picked out the second photograph. The jury can 
18 I use their common sense. There's absolutely no reason in 
19 J a case that has been relatively clean where there has been 
no prejudicial error, to show a mug shot. That's prejudicial 
by the fact that a mug shot, by the fact of the type of 
photograph it is, by the look on the person's face, when 
those are not the issues at hand. It just — we don't bring 
Mr. Albretsen in legirons nor do we show a photograph about 
a prior arrest. That's not proper and it's not relevant 
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or necessary. Mr. Stott is simply attempting to bring in 
things that might slowly bias the .jury to believe negative 
of Mr. Albretsen, and that is not the issue either. 
MR. STOTT; It's the most relevant in the case. 
She said it was going to be argued. That she failed to 
be positive. I want ^ the jury to understand why she was 
not positive. If that is not relevant, your Honor, I submit 
nothing is relevant in this case. 
THE COURT: The Court is going to overrule the 
objection and allow that to be admitted, because this is 
part of the actual observation she made regarding the picture 
and I don't know how else we could have her examine the 
photo she looked at. 
MS. LOY: Your Honor, I understand your ruling, 
but would point out one thing for the record, and that is 
Mr. Stott opened the area up after the photos in the book 
would not be admitted, so the Court has to take that into 
consideration. It did open that up, but Mr. Stott did, 
by asking about the differences in the photos and then admit 
the photo, although it was prejudicial. I think the Court 
needs to be aware of that argument as well. 
THE COURT: The Court is of the opinion, taking 
that into consideration, there may be some question in regardjs 
to the identification of the first photo. There the matter 
was brought up and she's testifying to something she did 
observe, and in order to clarify that, that the photo, as 
we have taken it in the black book, ought to be introduced 
70 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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1 and have her testify as to what reason she may have had 
2 in recognizing the party that is depicted in that photo. 
3 MR. STOTT: .Thank you, your Honor. May I call 
her? 
MS. LOY: I understand the Court's ruling, your 
Honor. In the alternative, I would rule this photograph 
be changed to at least — although it may not be how it 
was in the book, to be only the front picture rather than 
the two together, because that becomes a mug shot and is 
9 more prejudicial than a single picture such as this. j 
10 Secondly, I would point out Mr. Stott has already 
JJ had occasion to ask her about her selection of the photos 
and while he may have her identify that as the person who 
the photo she saw, I think further allowing him to reiterate 
her reasons for picking photographs, when he has already 
examined her on that point, would be repetitive, prejudical; 
allowing him to reput his case on again, and improper. I j 
think there's two steps there. 
THE COURT: The only thing I can think of we 
18 I ought to show both photos because both were examined by 
19 her. So we can possibly, if there is no problem, just puttinlg 
that one photograph so it's shown independently one at a 
time. Not side by side. 
Q. That's true. I don't want to give the impression 
of the jury that there were two photos in the book. I think 
we should put it in like it is because that's what she saw 
and we — the jury has to know what she saw. 
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* MS. LOY: Your Honor, I don't believe showing 
2 two photographs will cure the problem. They are obviously 
3 J going to be cut-apart mug shots. 
MR. STOTT: I don't know who it's obvious to. 
There's no testimony to it. The other pictures are of the 
same nature and they are in. 
THE COURT: We'll just show it as is. 
MS. LOY: Will the Court rule on my request 
Mr. Stott not be allowed to reiterate the prior testimony 
' that has already been asked and answered by the witness 
10 in introducing this photograph? That, to me, seems an improp^ 
11 I emphasis on evidence and would not be allowed in the formal 
course of trial once it has been asked and answered. He 
can ask about the identification of this photograph, identify 
this photograph if she can, but not get to reopen and rehash 
the things she has already said. 
THE COURT: I am in agreement with you, it ought 
to be limited to the extent which he has her identify, 
17
 that ought to just cure whatever problem there was with 
18 the identification at the beginning, but not to reiterate 
19 everything that was testified to. 
20 MR. STOTT: Fine, your Honor. 
[Whereupon, the jury returned to the courtroom.] 
I 
MR. STOTT: Your Honor, I would recall 
22 I 
Maureen Leavitt 
23 
24 
25 
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ADDENDUM B 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
ft Earrings? 
2
 * A. No. 
3 ft Let's see. I believe you said you came home 
4 on the 13th? 
5 A. Yes 
^ \ ft On the next day, the 14th, did you have an occasio 
to look at a book of pictures? 
A. Yes, I did. 
ft And who gave you that book? 
k Det. Hutchinson had brought them while I was 
still up in bed. I didn't see Det. Hutchinson at the time 
11 he brought them. 
12 ft So you didn't talk to him? 
13 J A. No, I did not 
ft So when you saw them on the 14th, your husband 
gave it to you or — 
A. It was on the kitchen table, and when I came 
down, he said that the detective had been there. 
MS. LOY: Objection to hearsay, your Honor 
ft (By Mr. Stott) You talked to your husband and 
looked through the book; is that right? 
20 I A. Yes. 
21 I ft Just briefly, this book had a lot of pictures 
or what? 
A. Yes. The book was a black book binder that had 
approximately 3 0 to 50 pictures in it 
ft Did you look through the pictures? 
14 
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1 . 
Yes, I did. 
2 
A
 What happened when you looked through the pictures 
3 A. I came across a picture that looked like the 
4 man that had beat me. 
5 Q> When you say "'looked like the man" — 
, A. I said to my husband, I said, "This looks like 
the man that beat me." 
QL Did you tell the detective that? 
A. When he came, my husband called the detective, 
then he came and I told him this looked like the man that 
had beat me. 
Q. The next day he showed up? 
12 I A. The next day he came with another set of photos 
13 that were on a piece of cardboard or something that had six 
or eight photos on it. 
Q. Let me ask you this first then. After you told 
the detective the person in the book that you had picked 
out looked like the person, he returned another day? 
A. Yes 
QL And at this time he had something else with him? 
A. Yes 
20 I Q, And that was some sort of a photo display? 
21 I A. Yes, it was a photo display. 
22 I & Describe that again, please. 
A. It was on a sheet of thick paper, like not quite 
I 
as thick as cardboard. It had six to eight photographs on it. 
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man 
a 
a 
that 
ft 
A. 
a 
a 
k 
a 
A. 
picture 
& 
A. 
a 
Exhibit 
that 
A. 
G 
A. 
What did he ask you to do? 
He asked me to look at them and if I saw 
beat me. 
out 
8. 
Did you look at them? 
Yes, I did. 
What happened? 
I immediately identified him. 
Immediately? 
Yes. 
Positively? 
Positively. And then the detective took 
of the thing and just had me initial the 
Did you do that? 
Yes, I did. Then he took it away. 
I show you what has been marked as State 
the 
the 
back. 
»s 
I will ask you if you can identify this exhibit. 
Yes. 
What is that exhibit? 
That's the cardboard or the second set of pictures 
I looked at, the photo display. 
G 
positive 
many 
A. 
G 
are 
A, 
G 
iy 
Okay. Is one of these the pictures that 
picked out? 
Yes. 
Which one is that in relation to these? 
there? 
Six. 
Which one is that picture? 
you 
How 
ADDENDUM C 
A. About the length of the gentleman in the yellow 
in the back. A little more over the ear. 
Q. And you described your — you're indicating one 
of the jurors here. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did not describe the cut of the hair or 
how it was combed, did you? 
k No, I did not. 
Q. You didnft describe the color of the eyes? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. You did not describe anything about the mouth 
or teeth? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. And you did. not describe anything about tattoos 
upon the person's face, did you? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. When you returned home from the hospital, do 
you recall what date that was? 
k Yes. That was May 13th. 
Q. And how many days later was it you saw 
Det. Hutchinson for the first time? 
k About a day or two later. 
Q. One or two days? 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. When you saw Det. Hutchinson one or two days 
later, you had still not returned to work, correct? 
A. No, I had not. 
52 
Q. You were still recuperating? 
k Yes. 
Q. You were on pain medication? 
k Yes, I was on Tylenol 3. 
Q. You were sleeping frequently? 
k Yes. 
& You were still having a good bit of pain? 
A. Yes, I was. 
QL YOU had an eye injury at that point? 
A, Yes, I did. 
Q. And which eye was that? 
A. It was my right eye. 
Q, And it was still taped shut or covered over? 
k No, it wasn't. 
Q. It was not? 
A. No. 
& You looked at a batch of photographs the detectivfe 
left for you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The photographs were of all different sorts 
people, weren't they? I 
A. Yes. 
Q. Some of different races? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Some of different heights? 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. You need to say yes or no for the reporter. 
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A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
lengths < 
you 
you 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
and 
Yes. 
Some of different face shapes? 
Yes. 
Small, round, square. Some of different hair 
styles. 
Yes. 
There were men of different ages? 
Yes. 
You chose a photograph that resembled the person 
remembered seeing at that point; is that correct? 
A. 
ft 
felt 
A. 
beat me. 
man 
it? 
the 
ft 
that 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
Yes. 
Then you told Det. Hutchinson which picture 
looked like the person? 
ii 
Yes, I told him, "This looks like the man that 
The picture you picked out that looks like the 
beat you was a picture of Mr. Albretsen, wasn't 
exhibit 
exhibit; 
A. 
ft 
A. 
is 
Yes, it was. 
You know that now. 
Yes, I do. 
A day or two later Det. Hutchinson brought you 
that I believe is State's No. 8, the photograph 
that correct? 
Yes. 
And showed you those pictures? 
Yes. 
4 
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*• ' ft And you picked one out? 
2 1 A. Yes. 
3 I ft Mr. Albretsen's picture was in that document, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes,.it was. 
ft And you recognized it? 
k Yes. 
ft It was a picture of the same person, Doug Albretsen, 
a picture of? 
A. Yes. 
10 I Q. You went to a line-up shortly after that? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 ft At the time of the line-up you had seen the 
book of photographs and the photo display we had marked 
as an exhibit? 
k Yes. 
Q, And at that time you saw Mr. Albretsen with 
seven other men in a line-up? 
k Yes. 
18 I Q, You identified Mr. Albretsen? 
19 A. Yes, I did. 
2Q ft At the line-up? 
A. Yes. 
Q, And you went to a preliminary hearing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the preliminary hearing you saw Mr. Albretsen 
sitting at counsel table, didn't you? 
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A. Yes, I did. 
1
 Q. At that time you identified him as the person 
3 I that attacked you, didn't you? 
4 A. Yes. 
c Q And now you have seen him here today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you first saw the first photograph in the 
book of photographs that Det. Hutchinson left for you to 
look at, what is it you said to your husband? 
A. I said, "This looks like the man that beat me." 
a All right. 
11 J Nothing further. 
12 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STOTT: 
6 
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Q. What was different from that photograph and 
the second photograph you saw? 
A. The first photograph, his hair was a little 
different. And it was a smaller photograph, if I can 
remember right. 
19 Q, Any idea to tell whether it was an older photograpjh 
20 than a more recent photograph? 
2i A. The second one looked like it was a newer 
^y photograph. 
Qt Why did you pick out the person whom you picked 
out in State's Exhibit No. 8? 
24 ! 
A. Because of his face. It's the man that attacked 
25 
ADDENDUM D 
k Yes, I did. 
2 
1
 Q, At that time you identified him as the person 
3 I that attacked you, didn't you? 
4 A. Yes. 
c & And now you have seen him here today? 
k Yes. 
Q, When you first saw the first photograph in the 
book of photographs that Det. Hutchinson left for you to 
look at, what is it you said to your husband? 
A. I said, "This looks like the man that beat me." 
Q. All right. 
11 | Nothing further. 
12 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STOTT: 
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Q. What was different from that photograph and 
the second photograph you saw? 
k The first photograph, his hair was a little 
different. And it was a smaller photograph, if I can 
remember right. 
1^  Q. Any idea to tell whether it was an older photograpjh 
20 than a more recent photograph? 
2i A. The second one looked like it was a newer 
22 photograph. 
Q. Why did you pick out the person whom you picked 
out in State's Exhibit No. 8? 
24 ; 
A. Because of his face. It's the man that attacked 
25 
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1 i me. 
2 I Q. It's because it was the man that attacked you; 
^ is that right? 
k Yes. 
Q, That's the only reason you picked it out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As I remember, when you went to Mrs. Cazier's 
house, you were bloody. 
8 I k Yes. 
9 Q. They were giving you first aid. An officer 
10 came, medical people came, I guess, while the officer was 
11 talking to you, you were getting medical attention. They 
were getting ready to take you to the hospital? 
k Yes. 
Q. Things were in a very hurried state? 
k Yes. 
MS. LOY: Your Honor, I would object to any 
more leading questions. 
17 I THE COURT: Sustained, 
18 I Q. (By Mr. Stott) Did you need any light on in 
the hallway? Did you need any light on in the house that 
afternoon? 
k No. 
MR. STOTT: T h a t ' s a l l I h a v e . 
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ADDENDUM E 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 what, after you left your house? 
2 J A. First thing I did that morning was I went to 
Job Service. 
ft Both of you went to Job Service? 
A. Yes. 
ft Do you know how long you were there? 
A. No, I don't. 
ft Approximately? 
8 A. Approximately about 45 minutes. 
9 ft About what time did you get there? 
10 A. About quarter to 9:00. 
« ft Where did you go after that? 
A. I — we drove around for a while, then we went 
to the school and picked my son up. 
ft What did you do after you picked up your son? 
A. We drove up into Parley's Way and Emigration 
Canyon. 
ft Well, what about your mother's cards, where do 
17 I they fit in? 
18 A. I took my mother's cards to her at 11:00 that 
+g morning. 
ft Was this before or after you picked up your son? 
A. I picked up my son at school before. 
ft Then you went to Parley's? 
A. Then I went down to my mother's shop, dropped 
my mother's cards off, and her box of candy. 
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1 ft So before you went to the mountains, you went 
2 I to your mother's? 
K Yes. 
ft Where is that located? 
A. My mother's shop is located on 970 South and 
Third West. 
ft And from there where did you go? 
k We went up to Parley's Canyon. 
ft Tell me the route, would you, please? 
9 A. Went up — after I left my mother's shop, we 
10 went up into Parley's Canyon, up in through Emigration and 
JJ back down out of Emigration. We went back to the house, 
had lunch. 
ft Let me ask you this. You went up Parley's. That1 
the main freeway. 
A. Yes. 
ft And how did you get to Emigration? 
A. I took the first exit off the freeway, went down 
17 in that way, back up in through Emigration and out. 
18 I ft Is that the East Canyon exit? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Where you go over the mountain then you come 
back Emigration? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You d i d n ' t come back down from P a r l e y ' s and go 
up around and come through Emigrat ion Canyon through the zoo? 
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1 A. No. 
2 ft In fact, when you came back down, you passed 
j the Zoo. It was on your left-hand side, I guess. 
A. That's right. 
ft Are you sure you went to your mother's? 
A. Yes, I am. 
ft Are you sure you went to the Job Service? 
A. Yes. 
* ft Are you sure you went up Parley's Canyon? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 ft Are you sure you made that little detour over 
jj Emigration Canyon? 
k Yes, I am. 
ft You're sure you came back down Emigration Canyon? 
A. Yes. 
ft Where did you go next? 
k Went to my house. 
ft You got there about what time? 
17 I & Between 12:30, quarter to 1:00. 
18 ft Had lunch? 
19 ] A. Yes. 
ft Remember what you a t e ? 
A. We had sandwiches and soup, 
ft I f I were t o ask you what you a t e the next week, 
would you remember? 
A. I t ' s p o s s i b l e . 
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